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1.1  Introduction 
Total nonemployment  is often decomposed for analytical purposes 
into two components: the frequency of nonemployment spells and the 
duration of an average spell. The frequency is the total number of spells 
and reflects the rate of employment turnover (quits and layoffs), while 
duration reflects  the length of  time  before employment  is gained  or 
regained. Although  most analyses of the youth employment problem 
among blacks and whites over the past decade have stressed job turn- 
over and the frequency of unemployment  spells, Clark and Summers 
(1982) showed that the duration of these spells is a crucial component 
of observed unemployment rates among youths and adults alike. 
This study investigates why the duration of  nonemployment spells 
experienced by young black men is generally longer than that experi- 
enced by  young white men. The analysis focuses particularly on  re- 
servation wages as determinants of duration. Reservation wages, de- 
fined  as  the  lowest  wages  individuals  are  willing  to  accept  for 
employment, are stressed in the job-search literature as the key de- 
terminants of the unemployment duration chosen by individuals on the 
supply  side of the labor  market. Of  course, labor demand can also 
affect the duration of nonemployment  for young blacks. The key de- 
terminants on this side of the market are aggregate demand, skills, and 
discrimination. The direct effects of these forces on nonemployment 
duration among young blacks  and whites are also considered below, 
as are the effects of low levels of demand on the choices of reservation 
wages made by each group. 
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The importance of analyzing the duration of nonemployment spells 
and reservation wages in studying black youth nonemployment (that 
is, unemployment or time  out of  the labor force) has already been 
demonstrated. Clark and Summers (1982) pointed out that the duration 
of  nonemployment  is  significantly  longer  among young  blacks  than 
among young whites. They also found that differences in unemploy- 
ment and nonemployment rates between young blacks and whites pri- 
marily reflect differences in probabilities of gaining employment among 
those without jobs, rather than differences in probabilities of becoming 
nonemployed.  Thus, by explaining the lengthy duration of  unemploy- 
ment and nonemployment among young blacks, we will be able in turn 
to explain much  of the huge  rates of nonemployment  among young 
blacks generally. 
Moreover,  by focusing on reservation  wages as a determinant of 
duration, this study should shed some light on the controversy over 
the relative willingness to work of young blacks and whites that has 
arisen not only in recent studies by social scientists, but also in the 
popular  press. In a few studies, young blacks  appeared to be more 
willing than young whites to accept certain low-wage jobs, even after 
having controlled for personal and family background characteristics. 
But others have stressed the reluctance of young blacks to accept low- 
wage jobs that are considered “dead end” or ‘‘menial.”1 According to 
adherents of this latter view, a younger cohort of blacks developed a 
new consciousness or a new set of expectations as a consequence of 
the civil rights movement, and they now shun those low-status  jobs to 
which large numbers of them had been relegated in the past. This point 
of view also stresses the role of crime as a superior source of  income 
and status among young blacks. 
Two primary  issues form the basis of this analysis of reservation 
wages, as indicators of the willingness to accept certain kinds of work, 
and the duration of nonemployment among young blacks and whites. 
The first is the potential difference in reservation wages between young 
blacks and whites; the second is the impact of these reservation wages 
on the duration of unemployment  within each group.  The paper will 
also examine some determinants of reported reservation  wages, but 
the study does not attempt a complete, structural model of reservation- 
wage formation. The data used in the analysis are from the youth cohort 
of the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) and the NBER Survey of 
Inner-City Black Youth. 
There are four remaining sections in the paper. Section 2 presents a 
general model for the analysis of nonemployment  duration and reser- 
vation wages; a discussion of some potential biases in the estimation; 
and a description of the data used for the estimation. The-third section 
presents the empirical evidence on the reservation wages  of  young 
blacks and whites. Differences in results among the various reservation- 25  Black Youth Nonemployment 
wage measures are explained, and some evidence is presented on the 
relationship between reservation wages, the characteristics of the jobs 
individuals seek, and the kinds of low-wage, low-skilled jobs that are 
more readily available to black youth. 
The fourth section explores the effects of reported reservation wages 
on subsequent labor market outcomes for young blacks and whites, 
namely, the duration of nonemployment spells and wages received on 
the next job.  Some separate wage equations are also estimated for 
different categories of jobs ultimately received. These equations also 
show which of the various reported reservation wages have the most 
predictive power with regards to the labor market.  Finally, the fifth 
section summarizes the results presented earlier and discusses impli- 
cations for employment policy. 
1.2  Models, Data, and Econometric Issues 
To  understand the relationship  between nonemployment  duration, 
job-search characteristics such as reservation wages and search effort, 
and demand more generally, the following identity is often used: 
(1)  E(DN),  l/P,,,,  l/[P(OfB,  . P(AcclOff], 
where E(DN),  is the expected duration of a completed spell of nonem- 
ployment beginning in period t;  P,,,, is the transition probability, or the 
probability that the individual will move from nonemployment to em- 
ployment within the specified time period; P(Off),  is the probability of 
receiving a job’ offer; and P(AcclOff),  is the conditional probability of 
accepting the offers received. 
The probability of young blacks receiving offers of employment re- 
flects, among other things, the demand for their labor that exists in the 
labor market. Among the factors that shift this demand is the level of 
aggregate demand in the local labor market, which includes the business 
cycle and the strength of the local economy; this factor has been shown 
to have strong effects on employment  among both black  and white 
youth.* A further determinant of  the demand for young black labor 
may be discrimination. Blacks may be perceived as having fewer skills 
than whites and therefore may face greater difficulty in obtaining em- 
ployment. Young blacks may also have less access to certain kinds of 
employment than do young whites, for the following reasons. Blacks 
who live in inner-city areas may have difficulty traveling to work in 
firms that are located in the suburbs; they may have less information 
about job vacancies than do young whites; they may have fewer per- 
sonal “connections” in firms where vacancies arise, and finally, their 
actual skill levels may influence the probability of receiving offers in 
the labor market. Although these demand-shift factors may determine 
the probability of potentiully receiving an offer, the probability of uc- 26  Harry J. Holzer 
tually receiving one also depends on the intensity of the individual's 
search effort. 
The probability of accepting offers depends exclusively on the level 
of the individual's  reservation wage relative to the offered wage. Of- 
fered wages are embodied in a distributionflw")  that is conditional on 
having received  an offer  and  that also reflects  on the demand-shift 
factors mentioned above. Jobs are accepted only when wo > wr, where 
wr is the reservation wage.  The expected duration of unemployment 
for an individual with search effort SE,,,  and reservation wage w;,~  is: 
where r  is the function relating search effort to offer probabilities, and 
F is the cumulative distribution function of offered wages. 
This equation assumes, of course, that reservation wages and search 
effort will remain constant over the entire expected duration of nonem- 
ployment.  If  this is not the case, the transition  probabilities and ex- 
pected durations for subsequent periods  will change and will be re- 
flected in the observed durations of nonemployment  . 
Expected wages are determined for a given offered-wage distribution 
and reservation wage in the following manner: 
(3) 
where each possible wage above the reservation wage is weighted by 
the probability of receiving it. This weighted sum is divided by the sum 
of the weights so that the sum of the weights equals one. 
Having observed how reservation wages interact with offer proba- 
bilities and offered wages to determine the expected durations of non- 
employment and received wages, let us now turn to the determinants 
of reservation wages. It is fairly standard in  the job-search literature 
to show that reservation wages are in part determined by the following 
factors : 
(4)  wr = wr(r,f(w),  Y,  d, HI, 
where y  represents an individual's nonwage income sources, d repre- 
sents his discount rate, and H represents his time horizon for ~orking.~ 
Nonwage income  raises reservation wages by lowering the costs of 
nonemployment, while greater demand-side  factors  and longer horizons 
raise  reservation  wages  by  increasing  the expected benefits  of  de- 
manding a higher wage for employment. Higher discount rates should 
lower these expected benefits and therefore lower reservation wages. 
Finally, both the mean and the variance of the offered-wage distribution 
f(w) have been shown to have positive effects on reservation  wages. 27  Black Youth Nonemployment 
This basic model can be extended in a number of ways to make it 
more pertinent  to white and black  youth. For instance, if  individuals 
do not  have  rational  expectations of  offer probabilities  and offered 
wages,  their  subjective expectations rather than the actual demand- 
side characteristics will determine their reservation wages; and overly 
optimistic expectations that adapt slowly over time may lead to high 
reservation wages. Furthermore, an individual’s reservation wages can 
vary across jobs if  the nonwage characteristics of these jobs vary and 
if these nonwage characteristics enter the individual’s utility f~nction.~ 
Thus, the reservation wages for jobs with  unpleasant  characteristics 
may exhibit demands for “compensating differentials.” 
Models in which utility instead of income is maximized  also allow 
tastes for leisure to affect reservation wages. These models incorporate 
labor-supply as well as job-search factors and can therefore be used 
to explain  search intensity  and  labor-force  parti~ipation.~  Thus, the 
reservation wages of people who are not always actively searching for 
employment is yet another factor to consider. 
Finally, these models often imply a declining reservation wage as 
the  spell  of  nonemployment  proceeds, rather than  the constant one 
assumed above. This decline can be caused by a number of factors, 
including declining assets or flows of outside income, the declining 
marginal value of leisure, adapting expectations, and systematic search 
behavior, by which higher wage offers are pursued  earlier and lower 
ones later. 
The models of reservation-wage formation and nonemployment du- 
ration discusskd here suggest that a set of recursive equations can be 
estimated empirically-equations in which the demand for individuals’ 
labor and other factors determine their reservation  wages, which  in 
turn determine subsequent spells of nonemployment  and subsequent 
wages. In particular, the following equations are estimated here: 
(5)  DNr+n =  DN(Xr, w:, sr), 
(6)  w,,,  = W(X,,W:), 
(7)  w;  = W.(X,), 
where DN,,, is the duration of the completed spell of nonemployment 
from the (1979) survey date onward; W,,,  is the subsequently received 
wage; w:  is the reservation at that time; S,  is a measure of search effort; 
and the X,  terms are the determinants of the demand for an individual’s 
labor. 
Except for these labor-demand  factors, the other determinants of 
reservations wages outlined  in  the foregoing discussion are omitted 
from equation (7). For example, many of these factors can be consid- 
ered endogenous with respect to reservation wages, such as the many 
sources of nonwage income ranging from government programs to il- 28  Harry J. Holzer 
legal activities.  The same can be said about earlier spells of nonem- 
ployment.6 Including these endogenous variables  as determinants in 
the model would  lead either to serious biases or to a  simultaneous- 
equations system with serious identification  problems.  For these and 
other reasons, the goals of  this  paper are simpler:  to compare the 
reservation wages of young blacks and whites, controlling for differ- 
ences in demand-side factors and to evaluate the effects of these reser- 
vation wages on the subsequent wages and nonemployment spells for 
each group. 
Nonetheless, certain other determinants of  reservation wages  are 
examined below in order to explain differences  in  responses by the 
same individual to different reservation-wage questions. Summary and 
tabular data provide evidence, for instance, on occupational expecta- 
tions and work horizons. The effect of nonwage  job characteristics are 
also considered, since the surveys used below asked respondents to 
choose among different reservation wages.  Also introduced is  some 
outside evidence on the role of nonwage income. 
It should also be noted here that equation (5)  is essentially a demand 
function; and  this  recursive model  achieves its identification  by in- 
cluding direct observations of the reservation wage rather than of the 
received  wage as the independent variable in the duration equation. 
The reservation wage itself is a function of the expected demand-side 
determinants of duration and subsequent wages, but not of subsequent 
duration or wages per se, thereby ensuring its exogeneity in equations 
(5)  and (6). 
The abbve equations are estimated separately for blacks and whites 
in all cases. Racial differentials in such variables as reservations wages, 
when  controlling for personal characteristics in X,, are obtained by 
using estimated coefficients from the equations for whites with mean 
characteristics of  blacks  to obtain  predicted  reservations wages  for 
whites having the same characteristics as blacks. The differences be- 
tween these predicted  measures and the actual ones for blacks  are 
considered estimates of the racial differential. 
Most of the econometric issues associated with estimating equations 
(5)  through (7) are discussed below in the presentation of the empirical 
results. But a few of the more salient problems, as well as the methods 
for dealing with them, deserve mention here. 
For instance, in comparing the reservation wages of blacks and whites, 
it is crucially important that the list of determinants of the demand for 
an individual’s labor, represented by X,, be reasonably complete. If it 
is not, unobserved characteristics that are positively correlated with 
wages and employment but negatively correlated with being black may 
bias downward any measure of the black-white differential  in  reser- 
vation wages. 29  Black Youth Nonemployment 
To  address this problem, we include estimates of  various specifica- 
tions  of  equation (7). In  some, the X, terms reflect a set of  specific 
determinants of wages and employment, including such human capital 
variables as age, experience, schooling, and “knowledge of the world 
of work”;’  background variables, such as household income and the 
presence of a library card at home; and other individual characteristics, 
such as region, residence in an urban area, and marital status. But since 
this set is bound to be incomplete, wages on the most recent job or 
weeks worked over the past year are used instead as controls in other 
equations. The former serves as a proxy for offered wages, and the 
latter, as a proxy for offer probabilities. Of course, received wages and 
weeks worked reflect expected wages and nonemployment durations, 
which are themselves conditional  on past  reservation wages. These 
variables are therefore instrumented on the exogenous X,  and appear 
only as predicted values in equation (7). 
These predicted values allow the inclusion in the equations of  indi- 
viduals who would otherwise report wages as missing due to their lack 
of employment in the previous year. But since the two predicted vari- 
ables are functions of the same underlying determinants, they are too 
highly correlated to be included together in  any single equation; they 
therefore appear in separate versions of  equation (7). The underlying 
X, variables appear separately as well for purposes of  identification, 
and  the  predicted  wages appear in  equation  (6) as controls for the 
offered-wage distribution. Weeks worked do not appear in the equa- 
tions, since wages are conditional on an offer having been received; 
proxies for offer probabilities are therefore not relevant here. 
As for durations of  subsequent spells represented  in  equation (6), 
the coefficient on the reservation wage is likely to be downward biased 
by  the  positive  correlation between  unobserved  characteristics  and 
reservation-wage measures and by  the negative correlation between 
those characteristics and the durations of spells. In fact, this downward 
bias was  serious enough to produce theoretically  incorrect  negative 
coefficients on reservation wages for whites in some versions of  that 
equation. 
It should also be noted that the source of heterogeneity in equation 
(5) is the correlation between  unobserved characteristics  and  reser- 
vation wages and durations, whereas in equation (7) it is their corre- 
lation with  reservation  wages and race. Thus, the controls that are 
appropriate in the two equations may differ. In fact, an expanded group 
of  X, variables, described below, enters directly  in equation (5); the 
inclusion of that group in the equation is the most successful way to 
rid it of downward bias. On the other hand, predicted wages and weeks 
worked were more  successful in  dealing with unobserved racial dif- 
ferences in equation (7). In short, the results reported below are some- 30  Harry J. Holzer 
times based on equations that use different controls for labor demand; 
these are pointed out in each case. 
A further source of downward bias in the estimated coefficients on 
reservation wages in equations (5) and (6) is the error that may exist 
in self-reported measures of reservation wages. This possibility could 
have very serious implications for much of the empirical work presented 
below, since differences in mean reservation wages are an important 
finding that could be undermined if the self-reported measures are not 
valid determinants of behavior. In fact, several of the reservation-wage 
measures reported below yield somewhat different results on the rel- 
ative reservation wages of blacks and whites. But by estimating equa- 
tions (5) and (6) separately for each of  the reported measures, we can 
test their effects on behavior and thereby determine their “validity” 
or relative degrees of error as shown in section 1.4. 
We  must also consider some of the potential selection biases inherent 
in  the analysis as well  as the sampling techniques employed. Since 
spells of  nonemployment observed prior or subsequent to the survey 
date existed only for those who were nonemployed at that time, the 
survey does not capture previous nonemployment spells for those cur- 
rently employed  and nonemployed, raising several selection  issues. 
First, Akerlof and Main (1980) have shown that individuals with mul- 
tiple spells of nonemployment  in a year account for a great deal of 
observed nonemployment. The focus in the present analysis on one 
spell per person thus overlooks the issue of  multiple spells. Second, 
Kaitz (1970) has pointed out that omission of previous completed spells 
can bias th’e  estimated mean duration of  spells in two directions: A 
“length” bias exists whereby short spells are less likely to be observed 
than longer ones, creating an upward bias in mean duration; and an 
“interruption”  bias also exists whereby only a truncated part of any 
given spell is observed, creating a downward bias. This issue is ad- 
dressed below by comparing summary evidence of current spells with 
evidence of previous spells that are calculated from retrospective em- 
ployment histories in the NLS surveys. 
Selection with respect to employment status can also bias the coef- 
ficients of all of the estimated equations. Heckman (1979) demonstrated 
that the correlation between the error term and the regressors of an 
equation induced by sampling depends on the correlation between the 
determinants of the sampling variable and those of the dependent vari- 
able of the analysis. Since individuals experiencing short nonemploy- 
ment spells are more likely to be currently employed than those having 
long spells of nonemployment, spell duration can be considered a de- 
terminant of observed employment status; and since reservation wages 
are the hypothesized determinants of spell duration, they are also de- 
terminants of  employment  status. Thus, the dependent  variables of 31  Black Youth Nonemployment 
equations (5)  and (7) are themselves the determinants of  the samples 
used to estimate them, and the correlation bias described above may 
be quite severe. 
To deal with these potential biases, the analysis presents the reser- 
vation wages of both the employed and nonemployed  in each racial 
group. The analysis also employs the inverse Mills ratio to correct for 
potential selection problems in some of the wage and reservation-wage 
equations that appear below. 
A few other sampling issues remain. Students are omitted from all 
the estimates reported below because their labor market experiences 
often reflect a different set of factors than those of nonstudents. Results 
not reported here, however, show similar ratios of  reservation wages 
to received wages among students and nonstudents of each racial group 
in the NLS; thus, the omission of students is unlikely to be a major 
source of  selection bias. 
The samples here include some individuals who had not searched 
for work in the month before the survey, since the discussion above 
indicates that search theory can be applied to those who are not always 
actively looking for work. Nevertheless, the relevant questions in the 
NLS were asked only of individuals who had searched in the past month 
or who intended to search in the coming year; those permanently out 
of the labor force are thus not included here. 
A final sampling issue is the oversampling of low-income whites in 
the NLS. Because we are interested in estimating relationships for the 
black and white populations rather than those nonrandomly  selected 
samples, and because estimated relationshps may vary across income 
groups, all  the estimates below are weighted by  sample weights to 
produce populationwide estimates. Although this technique may induce 
some heteroscedasticity, which would bias the estimated standard er- 
rors, the coefficients are unbiased  estimates of  populationwide  rela- 
tionships. The decision to weight the samples rather than stratify them 
by income was based on the small sample sizes used below. 
As noted above, two major data sets have been used in estimating 
the equations: the youth cohort of the NLS and the NBER Survey of 
Inner-City Black Youth. The NLS conducted a nationwide survey of 
young men and women aged 14 through 21 in 1979. The oversampling 
of racial minorities in this survey yields a sufficiently large sample of 
young black  men  (1,380) for comparison, with the sample of  young 
white men (3,081).  Since the NLS also oversamples low-income whites, 
all the estimates here are weighted by the sample weights to achieve 
a true nationwide sample within each racial group. 
Among the variables included in the NLS data set are reported reser- 
vation wages, search effort in the past month, and retrospective his- 
tories that give starting and ending dates for each period of  employ- 32  Harry J. Holzer 
ment. The 1979  and 1980 panels are both available. Thus, for individuals 
who were nonemployed at the time of the 1979 survey, the durations 
of  subsequent spells and  wages  later received  on the next job are 
available in the 1980 survey; these appear as the dependent variables 
of equations (5)  and (6). Durations for previous spells are within each 
panel. The NLS also provides extensive information on family back- 
ground and personal characteristics. Finally, occupational aspirations 
for the future as well as occupations currently sought are useful indi- 
cators of the accuracy of individuals’ labor market expectations. 
The NBER survey was conducted between November 1979 and May 
1980 among 2,400 young black men, aged  16 through  24, who were 
living  in  the inner-cities of Boston, Chicago,  and  Philadelphia.  The 
interviews were limited to inhabitants of city blocks with at least 70 
percent black residents and 30 percent families having incomes below 
the poverty line. The questions in  the survey focused on the daily 
activities of both the employed and nonemployed; their family back- 
grounds; their job-search behavior and experiences, including  reser- 
vation wages, number of rejected offers, offered wages, and time spent 
and methods used while searching; their retrospective work histories 
for the preceding 12 months; their income sources; their participation 
in illegal activities; and their alcohol or drug use. The usefulness of the 
NBER survey as a supplement to the NLS, which provides the bulk 
of the black-white comparisons, lies in its focus on northern inner-city 
blacks, who experience the greatest youth employment problems  in 
the nation; the direct comparability  of many  of the questions in the 
NBER survey to those in the NLS (after which  some of  the former 
were modeled); and the inclusion in the NBER survey of other ques- 
tions, not duplicated elsewhere, that investigate factors that may ex- 
plain the unemployment situation among young blacks. Together, the 
two surveys therefore allow a good comparison of young blacks and 
whites nationwide, as well as an additional look at a group of young 
blacks whose employment problems are especially severe. 
1.3  Relative Reservation Wages for Blacks and Whites: 
Controlling for Demand Characteristics 
This section presents empirical evidence from the NLS and NBER 
survey on the relative  reservation-wage  levels of  young  blacks  and 
whites. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 present summary evidence comparing var- 
ious reported reservation-wage measures to the received wages of young 
blacks  and whites.  These comparisons provide  a  crude measure of 
reservation wages relative to offered wages, for which we have no data. 
The next two tables indicate the distributions  of occupations sought 
and held by these groups and their relationships to the reported reser- 33  Black Youth Nonemployment 
vation wages. They show that individuals report quite different reser- 
vation wages according to the characteristics of the jobs to which they 
pertain. Some differences in reservation wages also appear to result 
from differences in the formats of the questions used to gauge them, 
as decribed below. Later in this section, tables 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7 show 
results from the equations in which wages, weeks worked, and other 
characteristics control for a broad range of demand-side factors that 
determine the relative reservation wages of blacks and whites. 
Tables  1.1 and  I .2 present summary statistics on various  reported 
reservation-wage  and  received-wage  measures in  the NBER survey 
and the NLS. The first table shows the means and standard deviations 
of received wages and reservation wages for  jobs the respondents were 
seeking or  aspired to more generally; the histograms below also present 
the  full distributions  of  many  of  these variables.  The second table 
presents frequencies of the reservation wages for specific jobs, such 
as dishwashing and factory work, that were designated in the survey. 
The reservation wages for the NLS data presented in table 1.1 reflect 
responses to the question, “What would the wage (or salary) have to 
be for you to be willing to take it?” which follows the question, “What 
type of work have you been looking for?” or “What type of work will 
you be looking for?” among those who intended to seek work in the 
coming  year.  The reported  reservation wage  is  therefore the  “job 
sought,”  where that job was allowed to vary across individuals. The 
responses were also open-ended: Respondents could state any wage 
rate they wished instead of answering “yes” or “no”  to specific rates 
listed in the 6urvey. The questions were asked of both the employed 
and the nonemployed who were seeking work or who intended to seek 
work that year, and the questions were asked in both the 1979 and 1980 
surveys. 
The reservation wages for the NBER data in table 1.1 also refer to 
jobs that vary across individuals. One question states, “Suppose you 
were offered a  job of the type that you are looking for,” and then states 
different travel times that would be necessary to get to and from work. 
For each time, the respondent was asked whether he would accept the 
job at $2.50 per hour and then at rates that increased by  SO  each until 
the respondent found an acceptable one. Thus, unlike the NLS version 
of this question, the one in the NBER survey used a closed rather than 
open-ended format. The NBER data for “job sought” reservation wages 
in table 1.1 indicate the wages chosen at the lowest travel time of 30 
minutes. 
Another series of questions in the NBER survey read: “Say that for 
some reason you had  to get (a job/another job) right  now . . . what 
would be the best job you think you could get?” “How much per hour 
do you think you would earn on that job?” “If  you were offered that Table 1.1  Means and Standard Deviations of Reservation Wages and 
Received Wages; NLS and NBER Samples 
NLS 
Reservation  Ratio of 
Wages for  Received Wages;  Reservation to 
Job Sought  Most Recent Job  Received Wages 
Whites  Blacks  Whites  Blacks  Whites  Blacks 
Nonemployed, 1979-80  4.59  4.47 
(1.96)  (2.21) 
North  4.73  4.51 
South  4.31  4.45 
(2.22)  (2.54) 
Employed, 1979-80  6.01  5.40 
(3.05)  (2.95) 
Full Year  6.18  5.29 
(3.06)  (2.36) 
Part Year  5.71  5.66 
(3.00)  (3.83) 
(1.85)  (1.77) 
Nonemployed, 1979  4.39  4.23 




4.75  4.00 
(2.76)  (2.20) 
5.05  3.91 
(2.96)  (1.88) 
4.02  4.07 
(1.98)  (2.45) 
5.13  4.26 
(2.25)  (1.86) 
5.32  4.30 
(2.26)  (1.88) 
4.76  4.19 
(2.16)  (1.82) 
4.23  3.85 
(2.97)  (2.41) 
Received Wages; 
First Job in 
Subsequent Year 
.966  1.118 
,937  1.153 
1.072  1.093 
1.172  1.268 
1.162  1.226 
1.120  1.351 
1.038  1.099 
Whites  Blacks  Whites  Blacks 
Nonemployed, 1979  4.36  4.20  4.73  4.33 
Work in Subsequent  (I .86)  (2.60)  (2.37)  (2.03) 
Year 
NBER, Blacks Only 
Reservation Wages  Received Wages 
For Job  For Best Job  For Any 
Sought  Attainable  Job  Most Recent Job 
Nonemployed 
Employed 
3.61  3.64  3.40  3.98 
(1.26)  (1.58)  (1.11)  (1.98) 
4.44  4.59  3.98  4.34 
(1.43)  (1.85)  (1.19)  (I .52) 
Ratio of Reservation Wages to Received Wages 
For Job  For Best Job  For Any 
Sought  Attainable  Job 
Nonemployed 
Employed 
,907  ,915 
1.023  1.058 
.854 
.917 
Note: Only nonstudents included in both the NLS and NBER samples in all tables. Total 
sample sizes in the 1979-80  NLS are 1,599 for all employed whites with wages and 1,130 
for those with reservation wages. Comparable numbers are 350 and 491 for nonemployed 
blacks. Sample weights are used in all calculations using the NLS. In the NBER Survey, 
sample sizes are 475 for employed and 821 for nonernployed young blacks. Reservation 
wages in the NLS are defined only for those who sought employment in the past month 
or intended to seek it in the next year.  Wages received in both surveys are for those 
who were employed in the past year. 35  Black Youth Nonemployment 
job tommorow would you take it if  it paid $-?”  In the last ques- 
tion, the same wage rates were used as those in the question in the 
preceding paragraph.  Although one might expect the 30-minute travel 
time designated in the earlier question or the stipulation of “having to 
get a job right  now”  in  the latter to bias the responses in  different 
ways, the responses were generally quite similar. 
A final question asked the respondent to list the “lowest hourly pay 
you’d be willing to take on any job right now,”  and these responses 
are also included in table 1.1. As was the case with reservation wages 
for “sought job” and “best job,” responses to this question were open- 
ended but directly followed the others in sequence. All questions were 
asked of ail individuals, both employed and nonemployed, in the sample. 
Several interesting findings emerge from table 1.1. Perhaps the most 
striking is that the reported reservation wages for  jobs sought by blacks 
in the NLS are similar to those reported by whites in an absolute sense, 
but blacks’ are generally higher relative to their previously or currently 
received wages than those of whites.  For the total sample of nonem- 
ployed, the ratio of reservation wages to received wages is 15.2 percent 
higher among blacks than whites. This black- white difference is higher 
in the North than in the South; but even for in the South, the ratio for 
the black youths is well above that for northern whites, who constitute 
three-fourths of the total white sample. 
Of course, we would  prefer to have data on offered wages rather 
than received  wages  for this comparison, but  the former were not 
observed. As mentioned above, received wages are endogenous with 
respect to re’servation wages because of the truncation of  the offered- 
wage distribution from below by previous reservation wages-the  higher 
the previous reservation wage, the higher the received wage and the 
lower the ratio of  the two. Thus, the ratio of reservation wages  to 
offered wages is likely to be even higher among blacks. These measures 
also ignore blacks’ lower probability of receiving offers; therefore, the 
level of reservation wages relative to the overall demand for blacks is 
presumably even higher. 
Most of  the analysis  in  this  paper concerns only  those currently 
nonemployed, since only they had the spells of nonemployment at the 
time of or subsequent to our observations on reservation wages. But 
as noted  above, selection  based on employment status creates the 
possibility that the individuals with lower reservation wages who had 
shorter nonemployment spells in the past are excluded from the sample, 
and that the magnitude of this effect could differ between blacks and 
whites. The evidence presented below of shorter previous spells among 
the empoyed than among the nonemployed raises the possibility that 
selection based on employment status may be an important source of 
bias. 36  Harry J. Holzer 
Table 1.1 also includes, therefore, the reservation and received wages 
of employed individuals in the NLS who were seeking or intended to 
seek new employment. Since we are primarily interested in the effects 
of reservation wages on nonemployment duration, the reservation wages 
of employed individuals who only do on-the-job search and who have 
not been nonemployed in the recent past are less relevant here. It is 
useful, however, to distinguish between those who have had nonem- 
ployment spells in the previous year and those who have not among 
those currently  employed. Also, an individual’s current reservation 
wage is not  necessarily  unchanged  from  that  which determined his 
previous nonemployment spell, but at least the current one provides a 
useful first approximation to the unobserved one from the past. 
The results  show that  the ratio of  reservation  wages to received 
wages is higher among employed blacks than among employed whites, 
especially among those who had nonemployment spells in the previous 
year. Thus, the omission of these individuals and their spells from the 
analysis does not appear to induce a major selection bias with regard 
to reservation wages. 
Table 1.1 also shows that the standard deviations of received wages 
among both the employed and the nonemployed, as well as their means, 
are generally lower for blacks. Thus, the apparently higher reservation 
wages of blacks cannot be attributed to a higher variance in their offered- 
wage distributions, despite the lower means. 
Finally, the reservation wages of the 1979 samples, and particularly 
of those who gained employment in the subsequent year, can be com- 
pared to the wages at which they gained that employment. Although 
a  comparison of  such  means provides  no evidence on correlations 
between the two measures, the comparison is at least useful as a first 
step toward evaluating the validity and effectiveness of self-reported 
reservation wages. For if  these reservation wages are truncating dis- 
tributions of  later wages from below, we would expect the mean re- 
ceived wages to be somewhat higher than the reservation wages.  In 
fact, the results here show this to be true for both groups, though the 
difference  is  not  significant for blacks. Thus, either the  validity  of 
reponses or blacks’ abilities to obtain these wages is more questionable 
for them than for whites. 
Before moving on to examine other results from the NBER survey, 
let us briefly consider the full distributions of wages and reservation 
wages for blacks and whites, as well as the summary statistics presented 
in  table  1.1. These distributions for the nonemployed, presented  in 
figures 1.1 -  1.6, show that the ratios of reservation wages to received 
wages are higher for blacks than for whites  at the medians of their 
respective distributions as well as at the means. The medians are 4.00 
for the reservation wages and 3.00 for the received wages of  nonem- 37  Black Youth Nonernployrnent 
ployed blacks, and 4.00 and 3.50, respectively, for nonemployed whites. 
The distributions also show that few of the jobs sought would be ac- 
cepted at below the minimum wage ($2.90 in 1979 and $3.10 in 1980) 
by either group, although a small fraction of received wages falls below 
the minimum for each group. 
Furthermore, the distributions of received wages are more promi- 
nently spiked at the minimum wage among blacks than among whites. 
If this difference is true of the actual offered-wage distributions as well, 
any movement of the reservation wages of blacks above the minimum 
will have correspondingly greater effects on their nonemployment du- 
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Fig. 1.4  NLS Nonemployed Blacks’ Reservation  Wages for Sought 
Jobs 
will be truncated by  the reservation wage, leaving a smaller fraction 
of  the distribution that is acceptable.  By differentiating equation (2), 
we can see this more clearly, namely, dPNE/dwr  = -  .rrf(wr),  where PNE 
is the transition  probability, wr  is the reservation wage, and .rr  is the 
offer probability. A more prominently spiked offered-wage distribution 
for blacks means a higherfwr)  for them and thus a larger effect on 
transitions and durations. This result is confirmed by  estimates from 
the duration equations for blacks and whites below, which show larger 
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Fig. 1.6  NLS Nonemployed Whites’ Reservation Wages for Sought 
Jobs 
among blacks. The higher spiking at the minimum for blacks also con- 
firms the evidence presented above that the variance of the offered- 
wage distribution appears to be lower for them and cannot be respon- 
sible for their relatively higher reservation wage. 
Thus far, the evidence that has emerged is fairly consistent in indi- 
cating that the reservation wages for the sought jobs of young blacks 
in the NLS are higher relative to their received wages than are those 
of young whites. Some puzzling contradictions arise, however, in com- 
paring the results of the NBER survey in table 1.1 with the reservation 40  Harry J. Holzer 
wages for specific jobs in both surveys in table 1.2. In table  1.1, the 
reservation wages for “sought jobs,”  “best jobs,” and “any jobs” of 
young inner-city blacks are well below those of blacks and whites in 
the NLS, especially relative  to their received  wages.  Furthermore, 
histograms on the reservation wages of the nonemployed in the NBER 
sample indicate that a substantial portion of the youths are willing to 
accept their sought jobs at below  the minimum  wage  and that their 
median reservation wages are close to the minimum wage at $3.00 per 
hour. That the medians and means differ quite substantially here is no 
surprise, given the spiking of the wage distributions around the mini- 
mum and the large right-hand tails. 
Other inconsistencies appear upon consideration of table  1.2. This 
table presents reservation wages for a list of specific jobs. In this case 
the format of the questions is identical in the two surveys, though the 
list of jobs considered in the NLS is longer. The question reads, “If 
you were offered a job as a -  ,  would you accept it at -?” 
In each case the wage rates considered are $2.50, $3.50, and $5.00 an 
hour. Table 1.2 presents the percentages of the nonemployed who were 
willing to accept these  jobs at each wage rate in the two surveys. Since 
this set of questions was asked only in the 1979 NLS, responses to the 
question on the  job sought for that year have been rescaled to  the same 
format and are presented here as well. The same has been done for 
the job-sought question in the NBER survey and for the questions on 
the most recently received wage in both surveys. 
Several strong findings appear in table 1.2. Perhaps most important 
is the much greater willingness of blacks than of whites in the NLS to 
accept each of the specific low-skilled jobs, even though there is no 
such greater willingness to accept the sought jobs. This is true among 
those in the North as well as in the South. It is even true when com- 
paring these reservation wages to received wages for each group. Among 
whites  and especially  among blacks, a  fairly  substantial  number of 
respondents were willing to accept these jobs at below the minimum 
wage, even though this was not the case for either group with respect 
to their sought jobs. 
Comparisons between the different reservation-wage  measures for 
each group produce some interesting findings. Among whites, the cu- 
mulative percentage of respondents willing to accept such jobs as fac- 
tory or supermarket work at $3.50 or $5.00 per hour is relatively close 
to the percentage for sought jobs at those rates, although virtually no 
one would accept his sought job at $2.50. But among blacks, no such 
convergence occurs: The percentage accepting work remains lower at 
each wage level for the sought jobs. The discrepancy is strongest among 
blacks in the South, whose reservation wages for sought jobs are higher, 
but for the specified jobs lower, than those of blacks  in  the North. 41  Black Youth Nonernployrnent 
Table 1.2  Reservation Wages for Specific Jobs: Percentage Willing to Accept 
Work  at a Given Hourly Wage or Less, NLS and NBER Samples 
NLS Whites 
Total  North  South 
$2.50  $3.50  $5.00  $2.50  $3.50  $5.00  $2.50  $3.50  $5.00 








Most Recent Job 
.02  .4  1  .70  .02  .40  .67  .01  .42  .76 
.25  .44  .65  .21  .42  .59  .35  .SO  .8  I 
.I8  .38  .62  .  I2  .3 I  .55  .32  .53  .77 
.I7  .34  .60  .I3  .28  .55  .26  .47  .68 
.22  .46  .70  .20  .44  .67  .28  .52  .78 
.I7  .39  .67  .I6  .35  .63  .21  .SO  .78 
.07  .59  .79  .06  .54  .76  .09  .72  .88 
NLS Blacks 
~~  ~ 
North  South 
$2.50  $3.50  $5.00  $2.50  $3.50  $5.00  $2.50  $3.50  $5.00 








Most Recent Jib 
.03  .4S  .75  .03  .4  I  .74  .03  .SO  .77 
.3  1  .55  .79  .3  1  .54  .77  .3  I  .55  .79 
.36  .60  .77  .33  .53  .68  .39  .65  .83 
.36  .60  .75  .36  .55  .73  .39  .68  .8 I 
.35  .71  .86  .38  .66  .82  .33  .76  .89 
.44  .69  .84  .40  .61  .78  .48  .76  .89 
.I6  .60  .82  .I9  .60  .80  .I2  .58  .83 
NBER Blacks 
$2.50  $3.50  $5.00 
Sought Job  .24  .6S  .93 
Factory Labor  .26  .61  .93 
Supermarket  .I9  .59  .89 
Received Wage, 
Most Recent Job  .I1  .57  .84 
Dishwashing  .I5  .47  .85 
Noret NLS samples are limited  to the  1979 panel of  the  survey, since questions for 
specific jobs appear only in that year. Only the nonemployed are included here. NLS 
sample sizes are 241 for all whites and 160 for those with received wages; for all blacks 
they are 186 and 90 for those with wages; for blacks in the NBER survey they are 821 
and 503, respectively. Reservation wages for sought job and received wages for the most 
recent job have been rescaled from the continuous to the discrete form. 42  Harry J. Holzer 
Finally, some demands for compensating differentials can be seen among 
both blacks and whites in the preference of both groups for factory or 
supermarket jobs over such unpleasant, dead-end, or menial jobs as 
dishwashing or cleaning positions. 
The NBER survey data show a greater consistency between reser- 
vations wages for sought jobs and those for specified jobs in factories 
and supermarkets. The same relative dislike as  in the NLS data of such 
jobs as dishwashing is also evident. But reservation wages for sought 
jobs are lower here than  for jobs like dishwashing.  Furthermore, a 
comparison of the reservation wages for specific  jobs between the inner- 
city blacks in the NBER survey and blacks in the NLS shows that the 
absolute willingness of inner-city blacks to accept these jobs is quite 
comparable to that of northern blacks  in  the NLS. If  anything, the 
reservation-wage rates are somewhat higher for the inner-city groups, 
especially at the $2.50 mark. In any event, the relatively comparable 
responses of northern blacks across the two surveys when the question 
formats were the same indicate the crucial importance of these formats 
in determining the different responses received. 
To  summarize, the results from the NLS show that reported reser- 
vation wages for jobs sought relative to previously received wages are 
higher among blacks than among whites, whereas reservation wages 
for specified  low-skilled jobs appear to be lower among blacks.  The 
latter result is generally consistent with evidence from the NBER sur- 
vey, in which the responses to similarly phrased questions show reser- 
vation wages for specified jobs among inner-city black  youths to be 
somewhat ‘higher than those of northern blacks  more generally.  The 
reservation wages of both groups indicate a demand for compensating 
differentials for jobs considered menial or unpleasant. 
A few hypotheses will be posed here to explain why responses differ 
across various  reservation-wage  questions, and some empirical  evi- 
dence will demonstrate the usefulness of those hypotheses. 
Two hypotheses regarding differences  in  the reported reservation 
wages are based on the two major differences between the questions 
asked in each case. The first attributes the differences in the wages to 
differences between open-ended and closed formats in the survey ques- 
tions. All but one of the NBER questions on reservation wages asked 
respondents whether they would accept specific dollar amounts, rather 
than  asking them to designate  their  own dollar figure; and the one 
question that did not follow this format directly followed the others in 
sequence. Accordingly,  tables  I.  I  and  1.2 show fairly consistent re- 
sponses to these questions in the NBER survey. By contrast, the “job 
sought” question in the NLS is open-ended, while the one for specific 
jobs uses specific dollar figures. The inconsistencies between responses 
to these two kinds  of questions are much  stronger in  the NLS, for 
whites and especially for blacks, than they are in the NBER data. 43  Black Youth Nonernployrnent 
One explanation for this may be that open-ended questions allow 
individuals to confound their wage expectations with their reservation 
wages.8 This is supported by the fact that explicit wage expectations 
were asked of individuals in the NBER survey, and responses to these 
questions were substantially higher than responses to the reservation- 
wage questions. In fact, the mean wage expected on the “best job” 
obtainable by nonemployed respondents in the NBER survey is $4.88, 
which is substantially closer in value to the reported reservation wages 
of blacks in the NLS than are the reservation wages for sought jobs 
reported in the NBER survey. The fact that inconsistencies in the NLS 
are higher for blacks, especially for southern blacks, than for whites 
may indicate either a greater degree of confounding on their part or a 
greater degree of expectational error on their part. 
The second hypothesis attributes differences in reported reservation 
wages to differences in the nature of the jobs being considered. Ques- 
tions probing reservation wages for sought jobs allow those jobs to 
vary among individuals and racial groups. The distribution of  those 
jobs for each group relative to what they can obtain may thus be an 
important determinant of reservation wages relative to received wages 
for each group. The jobs sought also differ from the specified jobs, 
which are primarily low-wage and low-skilled positions. 
Furthermore, different dimensions of the various sought or specified 
jobs may have different implications for the relevant reservation wage. 
On the one hand, unpleasant nonwage characteristics of jobs that might 
also be considered menial may lead to higher reservation wages for 
those jobs; this appears to be the case for whites and blacks within the 
NLS as well as for blacks within the NBER survey, all of whom are 
more willing to accept factory or supermarket work than dishwashing 
or cleaning work. On the other hand, jobs sought may command higher 
reservation wages than low-skilled jobs for a number of reasons. For 
one thing,  the low-skilled jobs may be regarded as more temporary 
because of their dead-end nature, whereas sought or desired jobs may 
be regarded as more permanent. As noted above, theoretical treatments 
of reservation wages within the job-search literature have emphasized 
the importance of the time horizon and its positive effects on reser- 
vation wages; and empirical evidence has shown that turnover rates 
are higher and employment durations lower in low-wage service oc- 
cupations than in other occup$tion~.~ 
Another reason why sought or desired jobs may carry higher reser- 
vation wages than low-skilled  jobs is that higher wages may be regarded 
as more appropriate and therefore more equitable for the former cat- 
egory  of jobs. A long tradition exists within the  literature  of  labor 
economics that emphasizes the importance of traditional wages norms 
for jobs and considerations of equity and relative position with regard 
to comparable workers.’” An understanding among youths that low- 44  Harry J. Holzer 
skilled jobs generally pay low wages may occasionally lead them to 
accept those jobs, particularly if  they regard those jobs as being tem- 
porary and if  they need the earnings temporarily while they continue 
to search or to aspire to longer-term  positions  for which  they  will 
demand higher pay. Of course, the youths’ willingness to accept the 
low-skilled jobs even temporarily  diminishes greatly when they con- 
sider those jobs unpleasant  or menial, as in the case of dishwashing 
and cleaning. 
It is therefore quite possible that the higher reservation wages in the 
NLS for jobs sought may reflect the characteristics of those jobs as 
well as a confounding of expectations with reservation wages. Again, 
one must ask why the willingness to accept temporary jobs would be 
greater among blacks in the NLS than among either blacks in the NBER 
survey or whites in the NLS. One answer may be that the dislike of 
dead-end or menial jobs is the relatively stronger effect for whites and 
northern, inner-city blacks. Or perhaps the expectations of blacks na- 
tionwide (including in the South) regarding attainable jobs or pay  at 
those  jobs may be more unrealistic than those of whites and of northern, 
inner-city blacks. Clearly, therefore, expectations about wages and  jobs 
attainable are an important part of both of the hypotheses above, al- 
though  their implications for reservation wages differ somewhat be- 
tween the two explanations. 
We  now consider some empirical evidence on the issues of occu- 
pational expectations and time horizons, as well as their effects on the 
various reservation-wage measures. Table 1.3 presents distributions for 
jobs held, sought, and aspired to at age 35 by nonemployed blacks and 
whites in the 1979 NLS. Distributions for jobs held before the current 
spell of nonemployment  as well as for those attained after the spells 
are both listed. Occupational aspirations are reflected by responses to 
the question, “What do you hope to be doing at age 35?” 
Table 1.3  Frequencies of Occupations Sought and Held by the 
Nonemployed, NLS 
Job Previously  Job Aspired to 
Held  Job Sought  Job Attained  at Age 35 
Whites  Blacks  Whites  Blacks  Whites  Blacks  Whites  Blacks 
Not Specified  .318  ,451  .SO4  ,560  ,325  ,352  .I65  .I04 
White-collar  ,045  ,059  ,075  .062  ,042  .I 10  .529  ,556 
Crafts and 
Operatives  ,339  ,185  ,262  .248  .397  .248  ,252  ,290 
Laborer and 
Service  ,298  ,305  .160  .  I30  ,236  ,290  ,054  .OSO 
Note: These are weighted frequencies for the 1979 panel of the NLS. “Job previously 
held”  refers to the 1979 survey, and  “job attained” refers to responses from the  1980 
survey by those nonemployed in  1979. 45  Black Youth Nonemployment 
The results show that the distributions of jobs sought and aspired to 
by young blacks and whites are remarkably similar, but the distributions 
of jobs held are not. More specifically, blacks are more heavily rep- 
resented in  the laborer and service categories as well  as the white- 
collar category (mostly clerical), whereas whites are much more heavily 
represented in the crafts and operative positions. Since the latter two 
categories generally include more highly skilled and highly paid posi- 
tions than the former, it appears that the occupational expectations of 
young blacks are higher than those of  young whites relative to what 
each group ultimately obtains. This view is consistent with one pre- 
sented over ten years ago by Goodwin (1973), who argued that blacks 
and the poor wanted the same kind of work as everyone else did, but 
they had no means of achieving their occupational aspirations. 
Having demonstrated the relatively higher occupational expectations 
of young blacks, we must still seek to explain how those expectations 
affect their responses to the various reservation-wage questions. Table 
1.4 presents the reservation wages of nonemployed blacks and whites 
in the NLS for jobs sought and jobs specified, disaggregated by job 
sought. As before, reservation wages for jobs sought appear in contin- 
uous form and as the percentage accepting work at $3.50 per hour or 
less; reservation wages for specified  jobs appear only in the latter form. 
The results show that the reservation wages of young blacks for jobs 
sought increase quite dramatically  when the job in  question moves 
beyond  the laborer and service category.  The percentage of  blacks 
willing to accept jobs at $3.50 or less drops from over 80 percent when 
the job sought is from the laborer and service category to 40 percent 
Table 1.4  Mean Reservation Wages by Jobs Sought of the Nonemployed, 
NLS-B 
Job Sought 
Crafts and  Laborer and 
Not Specified  White-Collar  Operative  Service 
Whites  Blacks  Whites  Blacks  Whites  Blacks  Whites  Blacks 
Reservation Wage 
for Job Sought  4.51  4.49  4.04  4.28  4.76  4.24  3.62  3.28 
Percentage 
Accepting - 
at < $3.50/Hour 
Job Sought  ,365  .409  ,529  ,322  ,422  .37  1  ,495  .8  I3 
Neighborhood 
Cleaning  .383  558  ,539  ,430  ,515  ,543  ,491  .5 15 
Cleaning  ,368  .629  .337  ,118  .438  ,592  ,344  ,669 
Dishwashing  .344  .&I5  ,303  ,413  .317  .533  .400  .688 
Factory  .479  .681  .479  .457  SO5  ,789  ,348  ,791 
Note: Sample sizes are the same as those in table 1.2. All means are weighted. 46  Harry J. Holzer 
or under in  the other categories. Among whites  this decline is also 
evident, though much less pronounced. The willingness of blacks and 
whites to accept the specified low-skilled jobs also shows some sen- 
sitivity to the jobs they claim to be seeking. In particular, those seeking 
white-collar jobs are less likely to accept specified low-skilled jobs than 
those seeking other jobs. But the differences in these results across 
the job-sought categories are far less striking than  they  are among 
blacks for the reservation wages attached specifically to the jobs sought. 
This relationship becomes even stronger when one compares reser- 
vation-wage measures within each category of jobs sought. Generally, 
those who seek laborer or service employment have reservation wages 
for those sought jobs comparable to or lower than their reservation 
wages for the specified low-skilled jobs. But among blacks, those who 
seek other jobs have higher reservation wages for sought jobs than for 
specific ones. It is clear, then, that the jobs sought by the black non- 
employed affect their reservation wages for those positions, although 
many of those who are seeking skilled blue-collar or white-collar jobs 
at higher wages seem willing to accept the specified low-skilled jobs at 
lower wages. 
The hypothesis that blacks will accept lower wages for the specified 
jobs because they regard  them as being more temporary  cannot be 
tested directly, but the fact that they regard them as temporary can be 
demonstrated on its own. The NBER survey included questions about 
respondents’ intended time horizons for their most recently held jobs. 
One question asked, “Did/Do you regard this job as being long-term 
or temporary?” and another asked, “How long did/do you intend to 
stay on this job?” Table  I .5  presents responses to these questions for 
the different occupational groupings in the NBER sample. Turnover 
rates, defined as the percentage of  respondents who lost or left their 
jobs in  the previous year, are also presented for these groupings. As 
expected, the results show that laborer and service jobs are more often 
regarded as being temporary by those who hold them than are other 
jobs; and intended employment durations for those jobs are shorter as 
well. Turnover rates, which are more objectively defined, also show 
higher rates of  movement out of (and therefore shorter employment 
durations in) laborer and service jobs. The evidence is thus consistent 
with the claim that black youths are less choosy about certain low- 
skilled jobs than they are about others they are seeking because they 
often expect the former to be temporary. 
Of course, none of these results demonstrates that the responses to 
the open-ended reservation-wage questions for sought jobs in the NLS 
are truly reservations as opposed to just expectations about wages. It 
remains to be shown which of the reservation wages listed here has 
the greatest power to predict subsequent durations of nonemployment 
and wages received. This issue will be addressed in section 1.4. 47  Black Youth Nonemployment 
Table 1.5  Time Horizons and Turnover Rates for Jobs by Occupation, 
NBER Blacks 
Crafts and  Laborer and 
White-Collar  Operative  Service 
Perceptions of 
Long-Term 
Potential of Job 
Long-Term  .39 
Temporary  .53 




< 3 months  .14 
3-6  months  .08 
6-  12 months  .02 
Indefinite  .67 
Turnover Rates  .64 
.40  .29 
.56  .65 
.04  .06 
.14  .19 
.12  .I0 
.03  .04 
.66  .56 
.66  .72 
Norr: Calculations  are for all who had  employment  in  past  year.  Turnover  rates are 
defined as the percentage of all with employment who lost or left their jobs in  the past 
year. 
For  now, the analysis  has shown that reservation  wages  for jobs 
sought by young blacks are higher relative to  the wages they ultimately 
receive than are those of young whites, while the reservation  wages 
of blacks for specific low-skilled jobs appear to be lower than those of 
their  white  c6unterparts. The comparisons between means (or fre- 
quencies) of reservation wages and received  wages  are a crude first 
attempt to judge the level of  reservation wages of young blacks and 
whites relative to the potential offered wages of each group in the labor 
market, where offered wages reflect the demand for labor facing each 
group. These comparisons are of only limited use here, however. 
For one thing, the comparisons include controls for offered wages 
but not for offer probabilities. Since black-white wage differentials have 
declined  in  recent  years while  employment differentials  have  risen, 
omitting the latter from the controls is likely to downward-bias the 
estimated black-white differentials in reservation wages. Furthermore, 
the endogeneity of received wages with respect to reservation wages 
is also likely to bias downward any measure of the latter relative  to 
the former. This bias may be compounded by the omission from these 
samples of youths without  any employment in  the previous year, a 
status that may have been caused for some by their high reservation 
wages. On the other hand, the ratio of reservation to received wages 
may not be constant across all individuals within each racial group. In 
particular, if  this ratio declines as received wages rise, the ratio of the 
means for whites may understate the true ratio among those whites 48  Harry J. Holzer 
whose characteristics  are comparable to those of  blacks. Thus, the 
black-white differential in this ratio may reflect an upward bias as well, 
and the net effects of these downward and upward biases are unclear. 
This analysis therefore estimates different specifications of equation 
(7) above for blacks and for whites. These specifications are then used 
to calculate racial differences  in  reservation  wages in  the following 
manner: 
where the B terms are the estimated coefficients of  equation (7) and 
the X terms are either predicted wages, weeks worked, or their un- 
derlying determinants, as described in  section 1.2." 
The equations used to predict wages and weeks worked appear in 
table  l.A.l of  the appendix. Those equations were estimated using 
01 S and included both currently employed and nonemployed individ- 
uals in the sample. Because of the large number of individuals without 
wages or work over the past year, some equations were estimated using 
the inverse of the Mills ratio calculated from probit equations for em- 
ployment in the past year. The coefficients on this variable proved to 
be highly sensitive to what was included in the first-stage probit equa- 
tion, however, and the predicted wage values were unstable and often 
implausible. 
Table 1.6 presents the results of simple reservation-wage equations 
for predicted wages or predicted  weeks worked  in  the NLS.  Some 
equations contain the continuous reservation wage for sought jobs as 
the dependent  variable, while others contain a dummy  variable  for 
whether or not the sought or specified jobs would be accepted at $3.50 
per hour. The latter results are from equations that were estimated as 
linear-probability models. l3  Most of those equations for the NLS sam- 
ple  were estimated separately by  region; these disaggregated results 
on the merged  1979 and  1980 samples for the continuous job-sought 
variable are presented here as well. 
The results in  table  1.6 show that the reservation wages of  whites 
are consistently more responsive to demand-side factors than are those 
of blacks. The differences exist both in wages and weeks worked and 
in  reservation wages for both sought and specified jobs. Most of the 
observed  differences  are also reasonably  significant.  l4  The regional 
breakdown indicates that the lower responsiveness is primarily a char- 
acteristic of blacks in the South, but regional breakdowns for the 1979 
NLS sample (not presented here because of very small sample sizes 
for southern whites) also show smaller coefficients for northern blacks 
than  for  northern  whites  with  regard  to  several  of  the  specified 
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Table 1.6  Coefficients from Simple Reservation-Wage Equations for 
Predicted Wages and Weeks Worked, NLS 
Dependent  Whites  Blacks 
Variables 
Wages  Weeks Worked  Wages  Weeks Worked 
.623  ,013 
(.085)  (.003) 
.630  ,012 
(.116)  (.003) 
,718  ,012 
(.175)  (.OW 
,716  .015 
(.153) 
,420  .007 
(.120)  (.003) 
,618  ,013 
(.162)  (.004) 
.260  ,003 
(.178)  (.004) 
,399  .007 












Wages < $3.50 
in  1979 for: 
Sought Jobs  -  ,817  -  ,015  -  .652  -  ,008 
(.219)  (.007)  (.287)  (  ,007) 
Neighborhood 
Cleaning  -  ,286  -  ,008  .I34  ,002 
Cleaning  ~  ,574  -  .019  -  ,285  -  .002 
Dishwashing  -  1.048  -  .032  -  .406  -  ,002 
Factory  -  ,201  -  ,018  -  ,701  -  ,012 
(  ,226)  (.007)  (.239)  (.007) 
(  .220)  (.007)  (.285)  (.007) 
(.  206)  (.006)  (.276)  (.006) 
(.231)  (.007)  (.257)  (.006) 
Nore: Separate equations estimated for wages and weeks worked. Independent variables 
are predicted  values based on the equations presented  in the appendix. Equations for 
the NLS are weighted by the sample weights. Only the nonemployed  are included  in 
the samples for the reservation-wage equations, whereas the wage and weeks-worked 
equations include both the employed and nonemployed.  Continuous reservation-wage 
and predicted-wage variables appear in logs. 
Table 1.7 shows the calculated racial differences in reservation wages, 
using the coefficients for whites from the equations in table 1.6, as well 
as those from equations in which the X, variables were directly entered 
into the reservation-wage equation. For the sake of comparison, racial 
differences in mean reservation wages and in the ratios of  reservation 
to (predicted) received wages are also included in the table. 
The results here show that the reservation wages of  young blacks 
for sought jobs are higher than those of  whites, after controlling for 
wages and weeks worked. This result appears to reflect the greater 
responsiveness  of  whites’  reservation  wages  to  wages  and  weeks 50  Harry J. Holzer 
Table 1.7  Black-White Differences in Reservation Wages, With and Without 
Various Controls, NLS 
Reservation Wages For: 
Sought Job, 1979-80  Sought Job, 1979 






Differences in Means,  ~  ,013  -.031  .051  -.042 
No Controls 
Exogenous Determinants 
of Wages and Weeks Worked 
Controlling for Wages  .094  ,098  ,092  .089 
Controlling for Weeks  .I34  .  I33  .lS5  .I49 
Worked 
Ratio of Mean Reservation  ,135  ,176  ,104  .I49 
Wages to Received Wages 
Controlling for  -.007  -.018  -.018  -.041 
Percentage Accepting Wages < $3.50 in 1979 for: 
Sought  Neighborhood 
Jobs  Cleaning  Cleaning  Dishwash  Factory 
1. Differences in Percentages,  .015  .076  .I94  .279  .227 
2. Controlling for Exogenous  .006  .053  ,150  .203  .219 
No Controls 
Determinants of Wages and 
Weeks Worked 
3. Controlling for Wages  -.134  .024  ,081  .088  .099 
4. Controlling for Weeks  -.167  -.025  -.041  -.I08  .013 
Worked 
Note: All differences are between blacks and whites. Mean received wages and weeks 
worked in all cases reflect predicted values here because of the large numbers of missing 
values for the actual variables. All means and equations are weighted. Coefficients from 
equations for whites are used along with mean black wages, weeks worked, or character- 
istics, to predict reservation wages for whites when controlling for these characteristics. 
worked, as well as the lower levels of these variables for blacks. The 
weeks-worked  control produces  a larger effect  than the control for 
wages, since the racial differential in weeks worked is larger than that 
in received wages; predicted values for both are shown in table 1.A.2 
of the appendix. This table also shows the mean values of the under- 
lying X,  variables for blacks and whites.  Unlike predicted wages and 
weeks worked, the racial differences in the underlying variables and 
their effects on reservation wages were not strong enough to produce 
a racial differential in reservation  wages when those variables were 
used as the controls. Thus, it is only the unexplained differences in 
wages and weeks worked between whites and blacks that cause the 51  Black Youth Nonemployment 
reservation wages of blacks  to seem relatively  high.  Whether these 
unexplained  differences  reflect  discrimination  or skill  differences  is 
unclear. 
The results also indicate that the racial differential suggested above 
by  simply comparing mean  reservation to mean  received  wages for 
each group is virtually identical to the one obtained from an equation 
that controlled for weeks worked. The various downward biases dis- 
cussed above in estimating the racial  differential  through  the means 
therefore seem to be almost exactly counterbalanced by the upward 
bias  of  using  a  constant ratio  of  reservation  to received  wages  for 
whites-a  notion rejected  by the coefficients on wages for whites in 
table  1.6, which are significantly less than one. 
The results for reservation wages for specific jobs remain generally 
lower for blacks than for whites even when controlling for wages. But 
in equations controlling for weeks worked, the willingness of young 
blacks and whites to accept those jobs becomes more similar. In the 
case of dishwashing, the control for weeks worked actually produces 
lower reservation wages for whites, perhaps reflecting the especially 
strong responses to wages and weeks worked of the reservation wages 
of whites for this job. 
In sum, the reservation wages of young blacks for jobs sought are 
comparable to those of young whites in an absolute sense; but they 
are higher among blacks after controlling for the effect of wages on 
weeks worked. The same relationship appear to be true of the jobs 
sought by young blacks. On the other hand, blacks’ reservation wages 
for specific low-skilled jobs are generally comparable to or lower than 
those of whites, even after controlling for these factors. It remains to 
be seen how the various reservation-wage measures affect the nonem- 
ployed durations and subsequent wages of each group. 
Before moving on to this issue, a final note should be made con- 
cerning the determinants of the relatively  high  reservation wages of 
blacks.  Although the discussion above presents some summary evi- 
dence on the roles of occupational  expectations and  job characteristics, 
there has been no discussion of the role of nonwage income-a  factor 
that is central to most job-search and labor-supply models. Evidence 
presented elsewhere, however,  indicates  that reservation wages and 
nonwage income are positively correlated for young blacks in the NBER 
survey.16 Furthermore, illegal income is a major source of nonwage 
income for this sample; and Viscusi (in this volume) shows that par- 
ticipation in  illegal activities  is negatively  correlated with  perceived 
labor market opportunity for this group.  Thus, the outside income 
generated by illegal activities (and other sources) for young blacks with 
low  skill levels may be an important source of their relatively high 
reservation wages. 52  Harry J. Holzer 
1.4  The Effects of Reservation Wages on Labor Market Outcomes 
This section uses the NLS panel data to investigate the effects of 
the various  reported reservation-wage  measures on the duration of 
subsequent  nonemployment  spells  and  on  wages  subsequently re- 
ceived.  The estimated results of equations (5) and  (6) are therefore 
presented and discussed below. 
1.4.1  Nonemployment Duration Effects 
Table  1.8 presents summary evidence on the duration of  nonem- 
ployment  spells among young blacks and whites in the NLS sample. 
The durations of three types of  spells are presented here:  The full, 
completed spell of all those who were nonemployed at the time of the 
1979 survey; the incomplete portion of the spell that occurred prior to 
the survey; and the portion that occurred subsequent to the survey. 
The calculations therefore use retrospective employment histories of 
both the 1979 and 1980 NLS to generate the completed spells for those 
who were still nonemployed in 1979. 
These results show that the durations of completed spells of nonem- 
ployment are about 28 percent higher among blacks than among whites, 
with somewhat smaller differentials for the portions of nonemployment 
occurring  subsequent to the survey and somewhat larger  for those 
occurring before  the survey. Almost  all of the differentials occur in 
the  North as opposed  to the  South. Nevertheless,  these numbers 
should be interpreted with caution, since the durations are substan- 
tially longer among southern whites than among northern whites. Thus, 
southern blacks also experience substantially longer Spells of  nonem- 
ployment than northern whites, who make up about three-fourths of 
the total white population  and thus are primarily  responsible for the 
aggregate results.  Blacks, of  course, are quite evenly split  between 
the two regions, and the aggregate results weight both regions about 
equally. 
Two other points should be mentioned here. First the NBER results 
are omitted here, since only the incomplete, prior spells are available 
for that cross-sectional survey. As was the case in the analyses above, 
the calculated results for the NBER sample are quite similar to those 
for northern blacks in  the NLS.”  Second, and as noted  above, the 
issue  of  previous, completed spells  among the currently employed 
must be acknowledged.  The previous spells were more likely to have 
been missed  at the time  of  the survey because they were  likely  to 
have been shorter. Looking only at the spells of the currently nonem- 
ployed  is  therefore likely  to give upward-biased  estimates of  mean 
duration, especially when considering the full, completed spells (which 53  Black Youth Nonemployment 
Table 1.8  Durations of Nonemployment Spells: Means and Standard 
Deviations, NLS 
Black-White 





























































.0  I8 
Note:  Spells calculated from retrospective employment histories  in the  1979 and  1980 
NLS for those who were unemployed in  1979. All spells greater than one year in length 
are included with a value of 365. All means are weighted using sample weights. Sample 
sizes are 241 for whites and 186 for blacks. The black-white difference is calculated with 
durations of whites as the base. 
are not  subject to the  downward  bias  of  truncation  by  the  survey 
date). In fact, the previous, completed spells estimated from the ret- 
rospective  histories are substantially  shorter than  any of  those pre- 
sented in table 1.8.18 Nevertheless, this difference in duration is roughly 
the same among blacks and w,hites. Also, the racial differentials for 
these spells are in the 20  to 30  percent range, thereby  reducing the 
case for a substantial bias in the estimated differences between blacks 
and whites. 
Thus, given that the nonemployment  rates for blacks and whites in 
the NLS are .396 and .196, respectively, the overall nonemployment 
differential is  102 percent; and differences in the durations of  spells 54  Harry 1. Holzer 
appear to account for about a third of the nonemployment rate differ- 
entials between the two groups in that ~amp1e.I~  It should be noted 
that this is a smaller fraction than that found by Clark and Summers 
(1982) or by Ballen and Freeman (in this volume), who estimated du- 
ration to account for over half of the nonemployment differential be- 
tween young blacks and whites. The one-third figure can therefore be 
regarded as a lower bound to the true estimate. 
Moving on to  the  estimated effects  of  reported  reservation-wage 
measures on these durations, table 1.9 presents the coefficients of the 
duration equations that take the form of equation (5) above. The de- 
pendent variable in each case refers to the portion of  the completed 
spell occurring  subsequent to the  1979 survey date, since the reser- 
vation wage reported on that date directly determines transition prob- 
abilities and therefore expected durations from that date onward.20 
As equation (5)  specifies, the independent variables are a reservation- 
wage measure; a dummy variable for whether or not the respondent 
actively searched for work in the past month; and a set of variables to 
control for the labor-demand factors that determine offer probabilities 
and offered wages. This set of  control variables  includes all of  the 
determinants of wages and weeks worked presented above, as well as 
dummy variables for occupation, industry, and collective bargaining 
for jobs held before 1979. Individuals without employment in the past 
year are given zero values on these variables  and values of  one on 
dummy variables for missing values2'  Other specifications of this equa- 
tion using the more limited set of demand determinants or using pre- 
dicted wages or weeks worked were estimated as well. But these con- 
trols were generally insufficient to overcome the downward bias resulting 
from omitted personal factors in the reservation-wage coefficients,22 
and theoretically incorrect negative coefficients appeared in these equa- 
tions for whites. Results for blacks were far more robust with respect 
to the controls used.23 
Two other features of the results presented in  table 1.9 (as well as 
in tables 1.10- 1.12 below for subsequent wages) should be noted. Sep- 
arate duration equations are estimated for each reservation-wage mea- 
sure. Those measures appear in both continuous and discrete form for 
the job sought, and only in discrete form for specified  jobs. The discrete 
forms appear as a pair of dummy variables that measure the willingness 
to accept work at $3.50 or less and at greater than $3.50 but less than 
or equal to $5.00. To  compare the predictive power of  the different 
reservation-wage measures with regard to outcomes, F-statistics are 
calculated for each set of reservation-wage dummy variables. The F- 
statistics can be compared with the critical F-values for joint signifi- 
cance at the .05 level for each sample size that appears in the table. 
The results show that reservation wages for sought jobs have strong 
effects on the durations of nonemployment among young blacks, par- 55  Black Youth Nonemployment 
Table 1.9  Effects of Reservation Wages on  the Duration of  Subsequent Spells 
of Nonemployment, NLS 
Whites  Blacks 
Equation for:  Coefficient  F-Value  Coefficient  F-Value 





Percentage Accepting Job at 
C $3.50: 
2.  Sought Job 
$3.50 
$5.00 
























-  ,315 
(  ,244) 
-  .042 
(.292) 
-  .018 
(.258) 
(.278) 




-  ,404 

















-  ,749 
(.339) 
-  .384 
(.358) 
1.10 
-  ,424 
-  .221 
(.301) 
(.355) 





-  ,047 
(.302) 
(.386) 
-  ,198 
.33 
.56 
-  .355 
(.338) 
-  ,251 
(.427) 
3.10 
Note: Separate equations estimated for each reservation-wage measure. F-values are for 
pairs of dummy variables indicating the willingness to work at given wages. The sample 
includes all those nonemployed in the 1979 panel of the NLS. Controls are a dummy 
variable for search in the previous months; all of the determinants of wages and weeks 
worked used above; and dummy variables for occupation, industry, and collective bar- 
gaining. Missing values on these latter variables are given zero values and special dummy 
variables that take on values of one. All equations are weighted using sample weights. 
Sample sizes are 170 for whites and 129 for blacks. Durations of spells and continuous 
reservation wages are in logs. Means of the dependent variables on the total samples 
are 4.412 for whites and 4.738 for blacks. 56  Harry J. Holzer 
ticularly among those in the North. Since both the durations and the 
reservation-wage measures are expressed in logs, the coefficients can 
be interpreted as elasticities. The results show elasticities of over 0.5 
for the nationwide sample of blacks and as high as 1.8 for those in the 
North. The results for whites are positive but much smaller and not 
significant. 
There are two possible interpretations for the smaller estimated coef- 
ficients for whites in these equations. As noted above, the coefficients 
are downward biased because certain unobserved components of de- 
mand are correlated positively with duration but negatively with reser- 
vation wages. If either of these correlations is greater among whites 
than among blacks, the resulting bias in their coefficients will be greater. 
There is, in fact, some reason to believe that both  correlations are 
greater for whites, since several of the observed measures of personal 
characteristics and family background  (not reported here) appear to 
have smaller effects on duration for blacks than for whites.24 Further- 
more, the simple equations of table 1.6 show a greater responsiveness 
of reservation wages to wages and weeks worked among whites than 
among blacks.  Consequently,  if  the observed and unobserved com- 
ponents of demand have similar relationships to duration and to reserva- 
tion wages, we can expect the downward bias to be greater for whites. 
A second explanation of the lower estimated effects of reservation 
wages among whites is that the effect is, in reality, lower for them. As 
noted above, the partial effect of reservation wages on duration is - 
~f  (W),  where n is the probability of receiving offers and Awl) is the 
value of the probability density function for wages when evaluated at 
the reservation  wage. The evidence in the appendix shows wage dis- 
tributions that are more spiked around the minimum wage for blacks 
than for whites, as well as reservation wages that are higher relative 
to received  wages for blacks, implying  a  stronger effect  of  blacks’ 
reservation wages on durations. Of course, we would expect the offer 
probabilities to be lower among blacks, and it is not clear what the net 
effect on the relative magnitudes of the partials would be. As discussed 
below, however, it appears that the probability of individuals’ obtaining 
some kind of job offer (albeit at the minimum  wage) if  they desired 
one may be quite high even among young  nonemployed  blacks; and 
thus young blacks’ relatively  high reservation wages for sought jobs 
may have strong effects on the duration of their spells of nonemployment. 
Given the estimated elasticities of duration with  respect  to reser- 
vation wages, and given the estimated differences in these reservation 
wages when controlling for the demand characteristics of blacks and 
whites, we can estimate the overall effect of these higher reservation 
wages on the nonemployment durations of blacks. The estimated elas- 
ticity  for blacks of  35,  together  with  a predicted  reservation-wage 57  Black  Youth Nonemployment 
differential that was estimated to be as high as ,135 relative to received 
wages for each group, implies that the higher reservation  wages add 
as much as 7.9 percent  to  the nonemployment  durations of blacks. 
Given the difference in mean durations between blacks and whites of 
28  percent, as reported in  table  1.8, and of  over 30  percent in  the 
dependent variable of the regression sample (see table 1.9, note), the 
results also suggest that a quarter to a third of the average racial dif- 
ference in duration may be explained by the relatively higher reser- 
vation wages for the sought jobs of blacks than those of whites. 
Since the duration of nonemployment spells appears to account for 
at least a third and probably over half of the higher nonemployment 
rates of young blacks than those of young whites, the suggestion that 
the reservation  wages of young blacks may  significantly add to their 
nonemployment rates is supported by the evidence. Furthermore, the 
estimated duration elasticity and racial differentials in reservation wages 
are even higher in the North than in the South, as is the difference in 
nonemployment durations. Although the estimated duration elasticity 
for the North seems implausibly high,25  the effects of northern blacks’ 
reservation wages on their nonemployment rates may be considerable. 
Of  course, these calculations use the highest estimates of both the 
duration elasticities and the reservation-wage differentials controlling 
for the demand characteristics that were estimated. It was argued ear- 
lier that in both cases the higher estimates are the more believable ones 
because the others are plagued by various downward biases. Even so, 
the effects calculated above of reservation  wages on overall nonem- 
ployment  durations and  nonemployment  rates for young blacks  are 
likely to be upper bounds to the true effects. 
A final  caveat  must  be mentioned  here with  regard  to the above 
calculations. These calculations assume that the elasticities of duration 
with respect to reservation wages will  not change as the reservation 
wages change; but, as the formula for the partial derivative implies, 
the elasticity  is itself dependent on the reservation wage.  More im- 
portantly,  a general decline in reservation wages should presumably 
lower the probabilities of receiving offers facing individuals if  the ag- 
gregate availability ofjobs is less than the number of individuals seeking 
work. Thus, the calculations presented above (of a quarter to a third 
of the racial differential explained by reservation wages) are even more 
likely to overstate the true contribution of reservation wages to the 
aggregate racial difference in durations. The power of the factors de- 
termining labor demand to explain racial  differences  in  durations is 
clearly established, despite the significant effects estimated for reser- 
vation wages. 
The results shown in table 1.9 indicate that the discrete measures of 
reservation wages for sought jobs have greater explanatory power than 58  Harry J. Holzer 
any of the measures of those wages for specified jobs in the equations 
measuring duration for blacks and whites. Nevertheless, the high joint 
significance level of the dummy variables for the sought jobs of whites 
masks the fact that the relative magnitudes of their coefficients are not 
“correct”  since those with reservation wages above $5.00 per hour 
experience the shortest spells of nonemployment. Among whites, only 
the reservation wages for neighborhood cleaning have coefficients with 
sensible magnitudes, of which at least one is marginally significant; 
among blacks this is true of the reservation wages for neighborhood 
cleaning, cleaning, and factory jobs. But none of these other measures 
comes close to having the predictive power or magnitudes of  coeffi- 
cients (both relative and absolute) that the measure for sought jobs has 
among blacks. The belief that the measures for sought jobs are less 
valid than those of specified jobs because the former represent a con- 
founding of  expectations and reservations may be partially true, but 
the strong behavioral implications of those measures support the case 
for their validity. 
1.4.2  Wage Effects 
This section addresses the effects of reported reservation wages on 
subsequent  wages.  Consistent  with  the  theory  that  received  wages 
reflect a probability-weighted average of an offered-wage distribution 
truncated by reservation wages, equation (6) specifies that subsequent 
wages be estimated as a function of  reservation wages and predicted 
wages, where the latter serve as a proxy for the mean of  the offered 
wage distribution. 
Table  1.10 presents  the results of  these equations for blacks  and 
whites. The reservation wages for sought and specified jobs appear in 
the same format as in the duration equations, with separate equations 
and F-values presented for each measure, and with the same predicted 
wage as that described above. The results show very significant effects 
of  reservation wages for sought jobs on the received wages of both 
blacks and whites. The effect is a bit stronger for whites, and for both 
groups the effects are greater in the North than in the South. In this 
equation,  the effects of  omitted  components  of  the  predicted wage 
should have a positive  rather than negative  effect on the estimated 
coefficients for reservation wages (since these components should be 
positively correlated with both reservation and received wages); these 
effects may be causing the higher coefficient for whites observed here. 
An alternative explanation is that whites are more likely to obtain 
their sought jobs than are blacks, and hence their reported reservation 
wages for these jobs are more predictive of subsequent wages. This 
explanation is consistent with the results in table  1.3, which show a 
greater consistency between occupations sought and those received or 59  Black Youth Nonemployment 
Table 1.10  Effects of  Reservation Wages on Received Wages at Subsequent 
Jobs, NLS 
Whites  Blacks 
Equation for:  Coefficient  F-Value  Coefficient  F-Value 





Percentage Accepting Job at 


























-  .422 
(.085) 




-  .I42 
(.079) 
(.082) 
-  ,220 
(.079) 
-  ,069 
(.078) 
-  ,072 
-  ,189 
(.083) 
(.091) 
-  ,090 












-  .348 
(.108) 
(. 112) 




-  .  167 
-  ,161 
(.089) 
-  ,044 
(.120) 
-  .31  I 
(.095) 
-  ,026 
(.121) 










Note: Separate equations estimated for each reservation wage measure. F-values are 
for pairs of  dummy variables indicating the willingness to work at given wages. The 
sample includes all those nonemployed in the 1979 panel of the NLS who reported wages 
for jobs obtained in the subsequent  year.  Predicted  wages are included as a control 
variable. All equations are weighted by sample weights. Samples sizes are 143 for whites 
and 99 for blacks. Continuous reservation wages and received wages are in  logs. 60  Harry J. Holzer 
held by whites. It is also consistent with the higher estimated effects 
of these reservation-wage measures on the nonemployment durations 
of blacks, which imply that blacks’ higher reservation wages relative 
to their offer probabilities  and offered wages lead to higher nonem- 
ployment rather than higher wages for blacks. 
Comparing the reservation wages for sought and specified jobs in 
their discrete forms, we find that sought jobs totally dominate all of 
the specified jobs for whites, in both magnitudes of coefficients and F- 
values. Among blacks, the F-values for sought jobs are a little lower 
than those for neighborhood cleaning and dishwashing jobs, but the 
magnitudes of the coefficients for sought jobs are very similar to those 
for neighborhood cleaning and are greater than those for dishwashing 
(though their standard errors are greater). Thus, the reservation wages 
for sought jobs serve as well as or better than those for specified jobs 
among both  blacks  and  whites  in  explaining subsequently received 
wages; and again, doubts about the validity of  this measure are not 
supported by its power to explain observed behavior. But the fact that 
reservation wages for specified, low-skilled  jobs have relatively greater 
predictive power for the wages of blacks than for those of whites also 
suggests again that blacks are more likely to have to accept these jobs 
in place of their preferred ones, even if  only temporarily. 
This analysis also tests whether the explanatory power of the reser- 
vation-wage measures for different jobs varies according to the nature 
of the job ultimately received. The same wage equations are estimated 
for two subsamples of blacks and whites: those whose jobs received 
were in the laborer and service category; and those whose jobs received 
were in the same broad category (such as white-collar, craft and op- 
erative, or laborer and service) as theirjobs sought. It was hypothesized 
that  reservation  wages for  sought jobs  would  have  relatively  more 
explanatory power in the latter group, while reservation wages,for the 
specified, low-skilled jobs would be more predictive in the former. 
The tests are rather crude because of the broadly defined nature of 
the occupational aggregates and because of  the much smaller sample 
sizes in  the subsamples. Nonetheless,  the tests are moderately suc- 
cessful, especially among whites. Table  1.1  1 presents results for the 
group with laborer and service jobs. The results show a strong increase 
in the explanatory power of reservation wages for dishwashing and for 
cleaning among whites, with a strong decline in the explanatory power 
of those for jobs sought relative  to the results for the total  sample. 
Among blacks the changes are less pronounced, but there is a strong 
increase in the  explanatory  power of  reservation  wages for factory 
jobs. 
Table 1.12 presents results for those who obtained the kinds of jobs 
they had sought. The reservation wages for these jobs continue to have 61  Black Youth Nonemployment 
Table 1.11  Effects of  Reservation Wages on Received Wages at Subsequent 
Jobs: Laborers and Service Workers, NLS 
Whites  Blacks 
Equation for:  Coefficient  F-Value  Coefficient  F-Value 
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(.138) 


















Note: Separate equations estimated for each reservation-wage measure. F-values are for 
pairs of  dummy variables indicating the willingness to work at given wages. The sample 
is a subset of that in table 1.10 and includes only those who obtained jobs as laborers 
and service workers in the subsequent year. Sample sizes are 64 for whites and 47 for 
blacks. Continuous reservation wages and received wages are in logs. 62  Harry J. Holzer 
strong explanatory power among whites, whereas those for the spec- 
ified low-skilled jobs have very little. Among blacks the strongest de- 
cline is in reservation wages for factory jobs, though the magnitudes 
on the coefficients for these and some of the other reservation wages 
for specified jobs actually increase. 
In summary, the reservation  wages reported for sought jobs in the 
NLS have a large, significant effect on the duration of nonemployment 
among young blacks and on subsequent wages among both blacks and 
whites. Reservation wages for the specified, low-skilled jobs also have 
some effects on subsequent wages, particularly among those who ob- 
tained laborer and service  jobs, and this is generally more true of blacks 
than of  whites. The belief that reported reservation  wages for sought 
jobs in the NLS are less valid than the others because the open-ended 
format of  the questioning  allowed  confounding of expectations and 
reservations is not supported here, given the stronger behavioral im- 
plications of these measures. If anything, the results here suggest that 
young blacks do aspire to the sought jobs and the reservation wages 
they reported, and these measures therefore appear to contribute more 
to  their nonemployment durations than do  the measures for low-skilled 
jobs. The low-skilled jobs may be temporarily  acceptable only when 
the immediate need for income is great or the nonemployment  spell 
has been quite long. 
A final issue to be addressed is that of the overall availability of jobs 
for young blacks. The large observed effects of reservation wages for 
sought jobs on nonemployment  durations in  this group imply  that a 
reduction ,in the mean level of these reservation  wages would reduce 
mean nonemployment durations and nonemployment rates. As noted 
above, the economic interpretation  of the large estimated effects is that 
offer probabilities for lower-wage jobs are high among nonemployed 
blacks, that is, jobs are relatively available to those who want them or 
who are willing to accept them at low  wages.  Needless to say, this 
interpretation would meet with a fair amount of controversy in a com- 
munity of young blacks experiencing  such high  rates of nonemploy- 
ment. Before this strong implication can be accepted, two questions 
must be answered: First, is there other evidence ofjob availability that 
is more direct than simply drawing inferences from estimated duration 
elasticities? And second, even if  these numbers of jobs are currently 
available to individuals who are willing to accept them, are they avail- 
able in the aggregate? Or is there instead a smaller number of such 
jobs available that only seem plentiful to particular individuals because 
most other individuals will not accept them? In other words, the offer 
probabilities facing individuals may depend on the aggregate level of 
reservation wages, and also the elasticity of duration with  respect to 
reservation wages may decline if there is an aggregate decline in those 
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Table 1.12  Effects of  Reservation Wages on Received Wages at Subsequent 
Jobs for Those Obtaining Jobs Sought, NLS 
Whites  Blacks 
Equation for: 
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Note: Separate  equations estimated for each reservation-wage measure. F-values are for 
pairs of dummy variables indicating the willingness to work at given wages. The sample 
is subset of that in table 1.10 and includes only those who in the subsequent year obtained 
the jobs they had  been  seeking. Sample sizes are 40  for whites and 23 for blacks. 
Continuous reservation wages and received wages are in logs. 64  Harry 1. Holzer 
These propositions may be the case, because the available jobs (or 
those with vacancies) are most likely to be those with high turnover 
rates  and those not  sought by  the majority of workers, namely, the 
low-wage labor or service sector jobs. Those jobs considered menial 
or dead-end may be the most readily available of  all because of  the 
high turnover in and the relatively high reservation wages for these 
positions. The important point here is that a general lowering of reserva- 
tion wages and of the level of job sought (or even of the turnover rates 
for these jobs) might substantially reduce the apparent availability of 
jobs to those who want them, leaving a more salient aggregate shortage 
of jobs among the nonemployed. 
The empirical evidence on these larger issues is neither extensive 
nor conclusive. Some unique evidence from the NBER survey appears 
in table  1.13. The inner-city black youths were asked, “Suppose you 
were desperate for money. How easy would you say it would be for 
you to find a job working as/at -7”  .  and several jobs were listed 
afterward. The survey responses indicate that over 70 percent of the 
nonemployed youths in the survey believed that it would be somewhat 
easy or very easy to obtain some sort of job at the minimum wage, 
whereas for other jobs, such as laborer work, the percentage was lower 
(46 percent for laborer work). These data imply that nonemployed, 
inner-city young blacks perceive a fair number of jobs are availability 
at low wages, which is consistent with the high estimated elasticities 
of duration with respect to reservation wages for this group. 
Several caveats must be mentioned with regard to these results. First, 
the NBER survey was conducted in late 1979 and early  1980, years 
that predated the recession that then plagued U.S. labor markets for 
the next three years. Second, the survey data are based on subjective 
perceptions or expectations of job availability; and as noted  abova, 
such expectations may be overly optimistic. Finally, these perceptions 
are clearly individual rather than aggregate and therefore tell us little 
about job availability if overall reservation wages were to change. The 
extent to which the estimated effects of reservation wages on the du- 
ration of nonemployment would hold for major changes in the aggregate 
remains unclear at this time. 
Table 1.13  Nonemployed Blacks’ Perceived Ability to  Obtain Jobs, NBER 
Survey 
Job 
Very  Somewhat 
Easy  Easy  Difficult  Impossible 
Working as a Laborer  .184  .276  .463  ,077 
Working at a Minimum  375  .328  .227  ,071 
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1.5  Summary 
This paper has analyzed the reservation-wage differentials of young 
blacks  and whites  and the effects  of those differentials on the non- 
employment durations and subsequent wages of both groups. The re- 
sults have shown that young blacks seek jobs and wages that are com- 
parable to those of young whites but that are at higher levels than the 
jobs and wages the young blacks  ultimately  obtain. These relatively 
high expectations contribute somewhat to blacks’ nonemployment du- 
rations, which  are already  substantially higher than those of whites. 
On the other hand, young blacks appear at least as likely, if  not more 
likely, than whites to take specific low-skilled jobs, although they seem 
to accept these only temporarily. A reluctance to take certain menial 
or dead-end jobs is evident among both blacks and whites. 
The overall implication of these findings is that young blacks have 
modeled  their  expectations and aspirations after those of  the white 
society around them, but their means of achieving those ends are fewer. 
It is not clear whether young blacks’ ability to attain their expectations 
is the result of lower skills, fewer contacts, less information, or simply 
discrimination. 
It does seem as though the concern expressed in recent years about 
a “culture of poverty” among poor blacks, namely, their lack of middle- 
class aspirations, is unfounded. Instead, the main problem faced by 
young blacks is how to achieve their aspirations. 
The results also shed new light on the potential of both public and 
private sector,  strategies to create only more low-wage, dead-end jobs 
for young, nonemployed blacks. To the extent that many young blacks 
appear willing to take these jobs temporarily, they may be useful in a 
limited sense as a means of providing income or training. But young 
blacks, like their white counterparts, clearly aspire to better positions 
than these, even in the short run. Unless accompanied by substantial 
training or some other means of achieving upward movement, public 
service  jobs or private ones created by policies like the proposed sub- 
minimum wage for youth are unlikely to meet the hopes and needs of 
the young black nonemployed. 66  Harry J. Holzer 
Appendix 
Table 1A.1  Log-of-Wages and Weeks-Worked Equations,  NLS 
Whites  Blacks 
In  Weeks  In  Weeks 
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.561  ,024 
(.355)  (.013) 
1.473  ,033 
(.405)  (.016) 
,144  ,038 
(.736)  (.042) 
(.759)  (.029) 
,168  ,019 
(.208)  (.008) 
1.309  ,027 
(.853)  (.070) 
7.786  .I46 
(30.5)  (.030) 
2.381  -  .014 
3.522  -  .007 
(I  .%I)  (.062) 
5.572  ,203 
(3.844)  (.186) 
~  ,670  .05 1 
(.663)  (.028) 
-  .016  ,003 
(.037) 
5.600  ,173 
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Nore: Equations estimated using OLS. Samples include all respondents reporting wages 
in the past year for the wage equations and all respondents (including those without work 
in the past year) in the weeks-worked equations. Household income (excluding own) in 
thousands of dollars. Knowledge of  world of work (KWW)  ranges from  1 to 11 for the 
number of questions answered correctly. Experience reflects the number of years in which 
the individual was employed as of one year before the survey date, starting in 1975. Table 1.A.2  Characteristics of the Nonemployed: Means and Standard Deviations, NLS 
Whites  Blacks 
1979-80  1979  1979  -80 
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(5.718)  (5.397) 
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(.383)  (.499) 
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141 
Nore: All means are weighted using sample weights. Predicted wages and weeks worked calculated using means from 
these tables and coefficients from equations presented in table 1.A.1. Sample sizes reflect those for whom reservation 
wages for sought jobs and all variables are defined. 68  Harry J. Holzer 
Notes 
1. Recent work by economists on the reservation wages of blacks and whites includes 
a study by  Borus (1982) using only one of the available reservation-wage measures in 
the NLS. Using the NLS data, he found blacks more willing to work, even after con- 
trolling for personal and local labor market characteristics. A study by Anderson (1980), 
which employed a more sociological perspective, stressed the reluctance of young blacks 
to do menial work. 
2. See Freeman (1979). 
3. For an excellent survey of the  job-search literature, see Lippman and McCall (1976). 
4. For a search model based on utility maximization that allows reservation wages to 
5. See Lippman and McCall (1976)., 
6. The endogeneity of nonwage income with regard to reservation wages derives from 
the fact that participation  in illegal activities or government transfer programs will  be 
affected by employment status, which in turn may reflect reservation wages. The en- 
dogeneity of the duration of preceding spells reflects the fact that an individual’s reser- 
vation wage may not vary greatly over time, and therefore current reservation wages 
reflect those in the past that are partly responsible for the earlier spell. 
7. The “knowledge of the world of work”  variable reflects the number of questions 
out of a possible  eleven that were answered correctly, where the questions involved 
choosing definitions of specified occupations. 
vary across jobs, see Holzer (1983). 
8. This possibility was first suggested to me in conversations with John Bound. 
9. See, for instance, Marston (1976). 
10. A classic statement of the importance of  transitional  wage  norms and  relative 
positions can be found in Dunlop (1957). 
11. The use of white coefficients and black mean characteristics rather than vice versa 
for this calculation  was based on two considerations. First, whites are generally  con- 
sidered the “baseline”  group in  the economy: using their coefficients  along with  the 
characteristics of other groups provides a standard by which to  judge the actual behavior 
of the other groups.  Second, table  1.6 shows that  black reservation  wages  are less 
responsive to changes in their characteristics than are those of whites. Thus, using white 
mean Characteristics with black coefficients will naturally show a smaller racial differ- 
ential than vice versa. 
12. Probit equations for employment in the past year included all of the determinants 
of wages, as well as a measure of own nonwage income and a set of dummy variables 
for occupational aspirations at age 35 to measure general attitudes toward work. When 
all of those variables  were included, the coefficient on the inverse Mill’s  ratio in the 
wage equation for blacks was ,420, with a standard error of ,200; predicted  log wages 
of blacks without previous employment was 6.30,  which was far higher than the predicted 
log wages of blacks who had been employed. On the other hand, when the aspiration 
variables  were dropped, the coefficient became -  ,129, with a standard error of ,335; 
and the predicted log  wage was 5.705, which  was considered too low. The predicted 
values in the absence of the Mills ratio seemed intuitively most plausible. 
13. Since the dependent variable here is dichotomous in value, it is more appropriate 
to use the logistic functional form than the linear. For the former model, P  = (I + r  I”). 
Nevertheless, when some of these equations were estimated using logit, the results were 
extremely similar. The less expensive linear estimates were therefore used throughout 
the rest of the study and form the basis of the results reported. 
14. The formula for the standard error of  a difference between estimated parameters 
is [(SI~,,.)~  + (SEh)? -  2cov(w.b)]”2 where the covariance term between whites and blacks 
is zero. 
15. In particular, the coefficients on neighborhood  cleaning with‘ respect to predicted 
weeks worked are -  ,0087 for northern whites and  ~  ,0009 for northern  blacks, with 
standard errors of .0076 and ,0089, respectively. The comparable numbers for cleaning 
are -  ,0196 and -  .0028 for coefficients and ,0072 and ,0091 for standard errors: and for 
dishwashing they are  ~  .0361 and -  .0077 for coefficients with standard errors of ,0065 
and ,0090, respectively. 69  Black Youth Nonernployrnent 
16. See Holzer (1983). chap. 6. 
17. The mean and  standard deviation of durations of incomplete prior spells in the 
NBER survey are 203.89 and  142.15, respectively.  Furthermore, the proportion of in- 
dividuals without employment in the past year is ,613. whereas it is .647 among northern 
blacks in the 1979-80  NLS. For northern whites this figure is ,855. 
18. Previous, completed nonemployment spells have means and standard deviations 
of 51.389 and 61.033 for whites and 64.216 and 71.803 for blacks. These durations are 
thus 25 percent higher for blacks. a percentage that is Fairly consistent with the relative 
durations of current spells. 
19. Since frequency and duration differentials contribute multiplicatively  rather than 
additively, a 28 percent duration differential and a 55 percent frequency differential would 
constitute a  100  percent nonemployment differential. 
20. Since reservation wages directly determine transitional probabilities, which in turn 
determine expected duration,  several equations were estimated of  the same form as 
equation (5),  but the dependent variable was P,,  a dummy variable for transition prob- 
ability that equals one if the subsequent nonemployment duration was 30 days or less. 
Results of this equation were generally consistent with those of comparable duration 
equations, though the coefficients  were generally  less significant in  the former. This 
difference appeared to be caused by a greater variation in reservation wages within the 
post-30-day  spells (which accounted for over 80 percent of the sample for both groups) 
than between the two groups of spells. 
21. These extra variables were not included in the wage and weeks-worked equations 
because these equations were estimated for both 1979 and 1980 and because. in each of 
these years, the missing-value  variables were endogenous with  respect to wages and 
weeks worked.  In other words, the missing-value variables were always zero if  wages 
were earned and were always one if  weeks worked were zero. This problem was not 
encountered in the duration equation because the missing-value variables for employment 
prior  to 1979 were exogenous with  respect to durations that occurred subsequent to 
1979. 
22. The formula for bias on the estimated coefficient of duration would be hl)N.t.,.h 
where the former coefficient is  the true regression  coefficient on the omitted var 
xx. and the latter is the auxiliary regression of the omitted on the included variable. In 
this case, the former would  be negative and the latter positive, creating a downward 
bias. 
23. The coeffibients on reservation wages for blacks for equations using  predicted 
wages or the more limited set of demand-side determinants as controls generally ranged 
from .4 to .5. 
24. For instance. the coefficients on KWW, household income, and experience were 
significantly smaller for blacks than for whites in the duration equations. 
25. The  estimated duration elasticity of 1.8,  together with reservation wage differentials 
of .I76 relative to mean received wages. implies an effect of ,317. which accounts for 
most of the racial differential in the regression sample for that region. Since sample sizes 
were fairly small here (N=71).  the results are subject to some doubt. 
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COmmeht  Ronald G. Ehrenberg 
Holzer’s paper has a number of attributes that I find very appealing. 
It focuses on an important topic and uses two different data bases to 
test the robustness of its findings. It uses alternative specifications of 
the variable of interest (reservation wages), examines the sensitivity 
of the results to alternative sets of control variables, uses a variety of 
statistical methods to confront a number of statistical issues, and hon- 
estly reports cases in which any of the above leads to differences in 
results. Finally, the paper does not claim more than the evidence war- 
rants-a  feature not present in enough academic research papers. My 
comments below should be taken with this overall evaluation in mind. 
I first raise some methodological issues and then turn to future research 
questions posed by the paper. 
Ronald G.  Ehrenberg is professor of economics at  Cornell University and research 
associate at the National Bureau of  Economic Research. 71  Black Youth Nonemployment 
Methodological Issues 
Holzer estimates a three-equation recursive model in which a vector 
of exogenous variables (X,)  influences an individual’s reservation wage 
at the survey date (W;);  these exogenous variables and the reservation 
wage influence the subsequent received wage; and the exogenous vari- 
ables, the reservation wage, and measures of search intensity influence 
the duration of a completed  spell of nonemployment, dated from the 
time the survey was conducted. Several methodological issues are raised 
by his analyses. 
First,  we  are presented with  a  parsimonious  specification  of  the 
exogenous variables (the Xs). Missing from the list is any mention of 
Unemployment  insurance eligibility  and  receipt, reasons for  nonem- 
ployment, whether the youths lived with their families, and variables 
that might influence subjective discount rates (which might vary sys- 
tematically by race). These omitted variables may well bias the results. 
Second, Holzer analyzes duration of “nonemployment”; there is no 
discussion of whether “out of the labor force status” and “unemploy- 
ment  status” can be  meaningfully  lumped  into one state. Although 
there is disagreement in the literature on this point (compare Clark and 
Summers [ 19821 to Flinn and Heckman [ 1982]), Holzer’s reported mean 
nonemployment  spell durations of 3 17 (406) days for whites (blacks) 
in table 1.8 causes me to wonder about the intensity of job search that 
is  being  demonstrated by  some of  the  youths  in  the  sample  and to 
question the relevance of the job-search framework. 
Holzer also uses as a dependent variable the spells from the survey 
date, including the reservation  wage as ofthat date. The latter is not 
allowed to vary with  the duration of the nonemployment  spell  up to 
the survey date. But  from the general theory of job search and  the 
empirical work of Kiefer and Neumann (19791, among others, we know 
that reservation wages should be expected to vary with unemployment 
duration. If reservation wages are associated with the duration of spells 
up to the survey date (both because of the revision  of expectations 
downward and the failure of the unemployed to be aware of general 
wage increases) and if  the duration of spells prior to the survey date 
is correlated with race, Holzer’s results will be altered accordingly. 
In fact, Holzer notes in  table 1.8 that  spell durations prior to  the 
survey date were some 35 percent longer for black  youths than they 
were for white youths. One might also expect longer durations of non- 
employment prior to the survey date to thwart job searchers’ efforts, 
negatively  influencing their  subsequent wages and prolonging  subse- 
quent  nonemployment  spells. Thus, the durations of previous  spells 
should probably enter all three equations. If this factor is omitted, the 72  Harry J. Holzer 
error terms are likely to be correlated across equations, and an esti- 
mation method that takes account of this fact should have been used. 
Fourth, in theory the same vector of variables X  should appear in 
all three equations in Holzer’s system, otherwise it is impossible to 
identify the independent effect of reservation wages on the other out- 
comes. Holzer solves the problem by some artificial restrictions that 
lead to additional omitted-variables problems. If the marginal effects 
of these excluded variables on duration and subsequent wages differ 
between whites and blacks, as does their correlation with reservation 
wages, this might explain why the apparent effects of reservation wages 
differ between whites and blacks. 
Finally, Holzer’s data permit him to distinguish between the nonem- 
ployed who sought employment in the past month and those who in- 
tended to seek work sometime in the next year. Since the former group 
is more likely to contain  “active” job searchers, some reanalysis of 
their  behavior  alone is  probably  in  order. Similarly, all  of  Holzer’s 
analyses  pool together youths of different ages. The NLS sample covers 
14- to 21-year-olds; the NBER,  16-  to 24-year-olds. Since we know 
unemployment experience changes dramatically as youths age, sepa- 
rate estimations for different age groups are also in order. 
Future Research Questions 
The first research question posed  by  Holzer’s study is why black 
youths are more willing than white youths to accept low-wage, tem- 
porary jobs. In answering this question one should distinguish between 
the behavior of those searching for temporary or part-time jobs and 
those searching for full-time career jobs. Again, the behavior of dif- 
ferent age groups would be relevant here. 
Second, Holzer presents data on reservation wages  for specified 
hypothetical  travel  times  to work.  Future  research  could  examine 
whether the compensating wage differential that black youths require 
for travel time to work differs from that of white youths. If  it does, 
why should this be so, and do  Holzer’s results suggest such a difference 
will  affect  nonemployment  durations? Also, if  data are available in 
Holzer’s samples on average travel times to work for employed black 
and  white  youths, one might  compute how  such  differentials affect 
nonemployment  durations. For instance, Ellwood’s findings (in this 
volume) that young blacks in Chicago spent more than two times as 
much time traveling to work as young whites in 1975 might be usefully 
applied here. 
Finally, future research should explicitly consider the role of social 
insurance programs.  I  have already mentioned unemployment  insur- 
ance, but more important may be transfer payments such as Aid  to 
Families with Dependent Children, according to which a family’s grant 73  Black Youth Nonemployment 
depends on reported total family income. Do such programs discourage 
work effort and prolong spells of nonemployment among youths from 
low-income families? Are there racial differences in the effects on teen- 
age nonemployment  because the probability  a teenager will be in  a 
family eligible for AFDC may vary by race? Analyses along these lines 
could exploit the fact that AFDC program regulations vary across states 
and therefore provide a form of natural experiment. 
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